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ABSTRACT 
In summer 2019 the German Federal Ministry of Justice has unveiled a draft Corporate 
Sanctioning Act (Verbandssanktionengesetz) to combat corporate crime. In this article, the 
author comments on the intended changes and highlights some issues that could be better 
solved differently in practice.
		
SEBASTIAN JUNGERMANN  |  DOES GERMANY NEED A NEW CORPORATE SANCTIONING ACT? 
 
PAGE  3 
COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 5   NUMBER 2   2019 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.	 INTRODUCTION 4	
II.	 CURRENT GERMAN FRAMEWORK FOR SANCTIONS FOR        
CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 5	
III.	 THE PROPOSED CORPORATE SANCTIONING ACT 5	
A.	 Principle of Opportunity 5	
B.	 Financial Penalties, a Formal Warning, a Monitor and the Death-
Sentence 6	
C.	 Internal Investigations, Sharing Internal Documents and Records 8	
D.	 Corporate Penalty-Register 9	
E.	 Incentives to Invest in Compliance 10	
IV.	 OUTLOOK AND REMARKS 10	
 
   
		
SEBASTIAN JUNGERMANN  |  DOES GERMANY NEED A NEW CORPORATE SANCTIONING ACT? 
 
PAGE  4 
COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 5   NUMBER 2   2019 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Early 2018, the political parties leading the new German government proposed far-reach-
ing changes to the criminal law for companies, they have agreed to provide a new system 
of corporate sanctions. In August 2019, the German Federal Ministry of Justice unveiled 
a draft Corporate Sanctioning Act (Verbandssanktionengesetz) to combat corporate 
crime. At the time of writing this article, the draft was still under tight wraps. As promised 
in the German coalition agreement between the Conservatives and the Social Democrats, 
CDU, CSU, and SPD, dated 2 February 2018 (p. 126), the intention of the political parties 
was to update the sanctions law for companies, to increase corporate penalties and to pro-
vide a new system of corporate sanctions. The new draft bill of a Corporate Sanctioning 
Act shall now introduce corporate criminal liability for business-related criminal offences, 
facilitate appropriate punishment of criminal offences related to corporations, promote 
internal investigations, and shall incentivize investments in compliance. 
 
As of now, applicable German law basically does not provide for criminal liability in the 
narrower sense of legal persons and associations of persons. This is justified by the (still) 
predominant opinion that only an individual has the capacity to act (Handlungs-
fähigkeit), can have criminal responsibility (Schuldfähigkeit) and can have the ability to be 
punishable (Straffähigkeit). All this does not apply to legal persons, corporations, and as-
sociations of persons. 
 
Since the Middle Ages, the question of whether misconduct in a company or association 
is sufficiently sanctioned and whether Germany needs corporate criminal law has been 
the subject of controversy. Important discussions have been published by Malbranc in 
1793 (Observationes quaedam ad delictas universitatum spectantes), where he opposes the 
possibility of attribution of guilt to universitas, and the potential criminal liability. Other 
renowned law scholars, among them Feuerbach, joined forces to this view. The fiction 
theory of Savigny was also important, according to which legal entities do not consider 
their quality as legal entities to be a mere natural person, to thinking, wanting and feeling 
beings, but a fiction. Such a fiction could be accepted in civil law, but would not be suffi-
cient as a basis for criminal punishment. These opinions have been reflected in the Ger-
man criminal laws of the 19th century, in particular in the Prussian Criminal Code 
(PreußStGB) of 1851 and the Imperial Criminal Code (ReichsStGB) of 1871. 
 
The current discussions have been reinitiated in 2013 with the presentation of the "Draft 
of a law for the introduction of criminal responsibility of companies and other associa-
tions" from North Rhine Westphalia (NRW). In 2014, the German Institute for Compli-
ance (DICO) submitted a daft “Compliance-Incentive-Act” proposal, suggesting to mod-
ify §§ 30 and 130 of the German Regulatory Offences Act (OWiG) accordingly. In the 
same year, also the German Federal Association of Corporate Lawyers (BUJ) submitted a 
“legislative proposal for an amendment to §§ 30, 130 OWiG”, which takes a slightly dif-
ferent approach. In December 2017, the University of Cologne then presented the "Co-
logne Draft of an Association Sanctioning Act" and early September 2019, an alternative 
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draft to the ministerial draft bill was introduced, the so-called “Munich draft of a Corpo-
rate Sanctioning Act”. 
II. CURRENT GERMAN FRAMEWORK FOR SANCTIONS FOR CORPORATE 
MISCONDUCT 
 
Under German law, companies are sanctioned de lege lata for misconduct on the part of 
employees and managers by setting an association fine in accordance with § 30 OWiG. 
According to this, a fine can be imposed on a company if a manager has committed a 
criminal offence or an administrative offence, a so-called attachment offence (Anknüp-
fungstat), which has violated the company's association-related obligations. According to 
§ 130 OWiG, the imposition of an association fine may also be linked to the violation of a 
supervisory duty by the owner of a business or enterprise. Other persons acting on behalf 
of the holder may also be prosecuted. According to § 47 OWiG, it is the duty of the com-
petent authority to decide whether an association fine will ultimately be imposed; the 
principle of opportunity applies (Opportunitätsprinzip). In 2013, the amount of a fine im-
posed by an association was increased tenfold to 10 million Euros. In addition to this pen-
alty component, it is also possible to skim off any unlawful profits, whereby this disgorge-
ment may exceed the maximum amount of the fine. As a secondary consequence, the ex-
piration of “the obtained” can be ordered. 
III. THE PROPOSED CORPORATE SANCTIONING ACT 
 
As pointed out above, recent discussions in criminal theory and legal policy have brought 
forward the arguments that current German laws for penalizing company-related crimi-
nal offences is insufficient. Politicians and others have proposed the introduction of new 
statutes for penalizing corporations, in particular for the following reasons and with the 
following proposals: 
 
A. Principle of Opportunity 
 
The German Regulatory Offences Act (OWiG) is subject to the principle of opportunity 
(Opportunitätsprinzip), and thus to discretionary prosecution. Based on that principle, 
some criminal corporate offences are not being prosecuted at all in practice, while others 
are. Given the significant difference in funding and support for public prosecutors all over 
the sixteen German states (Bundesländer), there are indeed also regional differences in 
prosecuting misconduct within corporate structures in practice. This was also raised in 
the coalition agreement dated February 2018, where the parties formulated: “We want to 
ensure that companies that profit from the misconduct of their employees are also penal-
ized more severely in the event of white-collar crime. So far, it has been left to the discre-
tion of the competent authority whether the undertaking concerned should also be pros-
ecuted. By moving away from the opportunity principle of the previously relevant regu-
latory offence law, we are ensuring uniform application of the law throughout Ger-
many.” The opportunity principle of the OWiG is indeed applied quite differently by 
public prosecutors throughout Germany. The intention was a uniform application of the 
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law. A study carried out in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) among 45 larger specialist 
public prosecutors' offices for economic and corruption proceedings has shown that not 
even in every fifth case a fine was imposed on the company, although this would have 
been possible. The proposal from NRW envisages integrating the criminal liability of le-
gal entities, associations not having legal capacity and partnerships having legal capacity 
into the scope of application of the Criminal Code. The principle of legality (Legal-
iätsprinzip), which provides an obligation to prosecute, applies within the Criminal Code. 
 
The Federal Ministry of Justice now seems to implement that principle of legality into its 
draft Corporate Sanctioning Act. If that proposal will become law, some German states 
have to invest heavily to increase forces and expertise to reach that obligation. Prosecutors 
will be obliged to initiate preliminary criminal investigations against a corporation upon 
sufficient reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence has been committed. Discretionary 
considerations, such as understaffed authorities or potentially lengthy investigations, 
which is often the case with international matters, will no longer constitute grounds for 
waiving criminal investigations. The available options to discontinue investigations on 
discretionary grounds under the Criminal Code (§§ 153, 153a StPO) will apply by analogy, 
though. However, the fact that the company has already suffered serious consequences or 
has conducted an internal investigation, may lead to investigations being abandoned. 
 
B. Financial Penalties, a Formal Warning, a Monitor and the Death-Sentence 
 
The current maximum fine is limited to 10 million Euros under German law (§ 30(2) 
OWiG). It is argued that this only constitutes a calculable risk for companies. On one side, 
the range seems to be too low for larger companies and too excessive for smaller compa-
nies. Although disgorgement may result in heavy fines, it is not a criminal penalty as such. 
Penalties for corporations under the German OWiG only may fail to reflect the serious-
ness of the issue and the damages done to society by corporate misconduct. Criminal law 
has a stronger deterrent effect than regulatory law. In addition, specific corporate criminal 
laws have become standard internationally. Not only 21 of the 28 EU-Member States and 
the United States, but also half of the OECD countries have established rules and legisla-
tion targeting corporate criminal activities. 
 
In the coalition agreement from February 2018 the political parties agreed to the follow-
ing: “We will extend the sanctions instruments: the current maximum fine of up to ten 
million Euros is too high for smaller companies and too low for large groups. We will 
ensure that the amount of the fine is geared to the economic strength of the company in 
the future. For companies with a turnover of more than 100 million Euros, the maximum 
limit should be 10 % of the turnover. We are also creating further sanction instruments. 
In addition, we create concrete and comprehensible assessment rules for corporate money 
sanctions. The sanctions shall be made public by appropriate means.” And: “We are also 
increasing the legal security of the companies concerned through clear procedural rules. 
At the same time, we will create specific rules on the termination of proceedings in order 
to give judicial practice the necessary flexibility in prosecution.“ 
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It was often criticised, that defence rights under German law in company-related investi-
gations have not been existent and rather inadequate. Defence rights have aimed at the 
individual, not at an association, and legal certainty is urgently needed here. 
 
The proposed Corporate Sanctioning Act provides for three types of penalties for corpo-
rations: (1) a financial penalty relating to the corporation, (2) a warning, reserving the right 
to impose a financial penalty, and (3) as a final resort, dissolution of the corporation. 
In addition and as agreed, financial corporate penalties shall be significantly higher for 
companies with an annual turnover of more than 100 million Euros. In cases of intent, 
the penalty will range from a minimum of 10,000 Euros up to 10% of the average annual 
turnover; in cases of negligence it shall still be 5,000 Euros up to a maximum of 5% of the 
average annual turnover. The average annual turnover to be set is calculated on the basis 
of the global turnover of all corporations operating as an economic unit over the last three 
financial years. The relevant date shall be the date of the sentencing decision.  
Similar fines are also available under antitrust law (10 % of the worldwide turnover) and 
data protection law (4 % of the worldwide turnover), which may lead to disproportion-
ately high penalties. In addition, the new draft Corporate Sanctioning Act also introduces 
the possibility of confiscation (§ 73 et seq. StPO), which is similar to disgorgement under 
the German antitrust law (§ 34 GWB).  
The timing to calculate the turnover may impose major risks in M&A transactions as well. 
Concerning a share deal, and in case the target is integrated into the buyers group, which 
is often the case, the base for the fine may be increased significantly. Similar risks will be 
seen in case of an asset deal. All this may create the risk of excessive and disproportionate 
corporate penalties under the new law. 
 
However, mitigation provisions apply if the company has in fact contributed to clarifying 
the corporate misconduct by conducting an internal investigation and cooperation with 
the prosecutors. Another option to end the official proceedings under the proposed Cor-
porate Sanctioning Act is the issuing of a formal warning while reserving the right to im-
pose a financial penalty. This warning option may apply where it is expected that (1) a 
warning suffices to prevent future corporate misconduct, (2) an overall assessment of all 
circumstances deems the imposition of financial penalties unnecessary, and (3) the 
maintenance of the legal order does not require penalties.  
In such situations, the court may impose conditions and directives for the period of one 
to five years in which the right to impose a penalty is reserved. In particular, a court may 
order the implementation of a more efficient and stricter internal compliance system and 
the appointment of an external expert as compliance monitor to prevent further corpo-
rate misconduct. Such warning is somehow similar to the non- and deferred prosecution 
agreements as known in other jurisdictions, like the U.S., UK, and France. It is proposed 
to also incorporate such option into German law as an alternative way of ending criminal 
proceedings. However, in case the requirements mentioned above will not be met, the 
court may reserve the right to impose up to 50 % of the penalties if this is sufficient to 
prevent future corporate misconduct. Moreover, the prosecutor may provisionally waive 
an indictment and impose conditions and issue instructions instead (which is similar to § 
153a StPO). 
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As ultima-ratio, the dissolution of the company is possible in extreme cases, the death-
sentence so to speak. For example, when a senior manager “persistently commits serious 
corporate offences” or when “the continued existence of the corporation increases the risk 
of serious corporate offences to be committed”. 
 
C. Internal Investigations, Sharing Internal Documents and Records 
 
Considering internal investigations, there are currently no statutory provisions under 
German law on how to conduct such investigations in order to establish the facts and 
circumstances. There are no standards yet which take into consideration such investiga-
tive attempts and cooperative behaviour. Moreover, the German Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure (StPO) does not touch upon the circumstances in which corporations might have 
to grant prosecutors and investigative authorities access to their internal investigation rec-
ords. 
 
In the coalition agreement dated February 2018 the political parties agreed: “In order to 
create legal certainty for all parties involved, we will create legal requirements for internal 
investigations, in particular with regard to confiscated documents and search possibilities. 
We will provide legal incentives for internal investigations to provide clarification assis-
tance and for the subsequent disclosure of the findings.”  
There is great legal uncertainty as to whether and how the protection against seizure of 
legal opinions, interview records and other documents within the framework of internal 
investigations should be designed. Also the German case law is quite contradictory. The 
introduction of clear rules on the prohibition of seizure and exploitation in the sense of a 
“legal privilege” would be a sensible approach and urgently required. The German Con-
stitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) decided in July 2018 on the searches of 
Volkswagen's law firm in the diesel affair and ruled, that the seizure of internal documents 
and reports during a law firm raid in March 2017 was in line with German Constitutional 
law. The analysis of these rulings has been quite contradictory as well, and legal certainty 
is still urgently required. 
Today, a complete and sincere cooperation can often lead to a suspension of proceedings 
or milder sanctions. However, these decisions are largely at the discretion of the authori-
ties. In May 2017, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) mitigated the impact 
of compliance efforts. Clear rules on the benefits of cooperation and disclosure of any 
findings would be welcome. 
 
The new draft Corporate Sanctioning Act allows for a reduction in penalties imposed on 
corporations in the event that internal investigations are conducted, if the following re-
quirements have been met: (1) the internal investigations must be independent and not 
conducted by the corporation’s defence counsel, and it must provide a material contribu-
tion to clarifying the corporate misconduct, (2) the corporation must cooperate continu-
ously and unrestrictedly with the prosecutors, and the results of the internal investiga-
tions, the relevant and essential documents and the final report on the internal investiga-
tions must be disclosed to the prosecutors, and internal investigations must be conducted 
in compliance with fair trial principles. The latter requires, that employees must be in-
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formed that the information they provide may be used against them in criminal proceed-
ings, prior to the interview, interviewees must be given the possibility to retain their own 
lawyer or have a member of the works council present during the interview, and inter-
viewees must have the right to refuse giving testimony if the response to such questions 
would otherwise expose him or her or any of their relatives to prosecution for a criminal 
or regulatory offence, and the internal investigations must be conducted in compliance 
with the applicable laws and documented appropriately. The requirements for such in-
ternal investigations seem to be quite high and it remains to be seen, how parties will deal 
with such requirements if enacted. However, such approach indeed provides a first frame-
work for conducting internal investigations under German law, and if companies comply 
with the requirements mentioned above for internal investigations and cooperation, they 
do have a chance that prosecutors may refrain entirely from prosecuting the corporation 
until the internal investigation is completed. 
 
However, the proposed amendment of the protection from seizure (§ 97(1) No. 3 StPO) 
may be cause for serious concern. The legal privilege and protection from seizure under 
German law will be limited even further. The draft Corporate Sanctioning Act proposes 
that all records and documents in the custody of lawyers may be seized unless the client 
in question is formally a defendant in criminal proceedings. For such relationship, a “re-
lationship of trust” must exists concerning the documents. It is also not clear, whether 
and to what extent attorney work products prepared in the context of an internal investi-
gation, like interview minutes, draft and final reports and presentations, shall be protected 
from seizure. It is also unclear, what kind of rights the defendant may have and how the 
legal privilege shall work, in case the internal investigation runs parallel to criminal pro-
ceedings, and how to deal with the separation between internal investigators and corpo-
rate counsel. It may be appropriate to make clear that a “relationship of trust” exists re-
gardless of any formal position as internal investigator or defence counsel, and the Ger-
man legal privilege and protection from seizure should cover all attorney work products 
of an internal investigation, at least when the investigation runs parallel to the criminal 
proceedings. One major problem under German law is the approach, that if an internal 
investigation is conducted prior to criminal proceedings, and before the corporation has 
been formally deemed a defendant, it seems that such documents are not protected from 
seizure and no legal privilege exists because the corporation is not yet a defendant. The 
proposed approach would constitute major issues and may lead to an unacceptable weak-
ening of the rights of companies to defend themselves. 
 
D. Corporate Penalty-Register 
 
The draft Corporate Sanctioning Act also provides for a register, to be organized by Ger-
many’s Federal Ministry of Justice. Final decisions on imposing penalties or fines on cor-
porations shall be entered into this register, together with data required to identify the 
corporation, the criminal or administrative offence in question and the applied provi-
sions. However, only prosecutors, public authorities and courts may receive unlimited 
access to the new register, and only upon express request. 
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E. Incentives to Invest in Compliance 
 
Finally, the draft Corporate Sanctioning Act also provides for certain incentives for in-
vestments in compliance programmes. First, existing compliance measures can initially be 
taken into consideration when assessing the amount of a penalty. Thus, the draft Corpo-
rate Sanctioning Act takes the ruling of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) 
dated 9 May 2017 into consideration. The compliance set-up of a company may be deci-
sive for choosing the type of sanction to be imposed, and the court may also order to in-
struct an external compliance monitor, as described above. The compliance monitor 
should be selected and must be paid by the corporation, while the engagement is subject 
to the court’s approval. And it is expected that the compliance monitor shall prepare re-
ports and expert opinions for the court. 
IV. OUTLOOK AND REMARKS 
 
The German Corporate Sanctioning Act is to enter into force two years after its promul-
gation, which shall give companies sufficient time to check their internal processes and to 
implement additional compliance measures if necessary. 
However, if judging the arguments, one must simply state that there is no legally compel-
ling necessity for the introduction of Corporate Sanctioning Act. But there is also no 
doubt that the procedure for sanctioning corporations needs improvement. This need 
cannot necessarily be satisfied by means of criminal law. From a political point of view, 
however, the time is evidently ripe for a corporate criminal law also in Germany. Too 
many jurisdictions with similar legal traditions have moved on into such direction. A gen-
uine corporate criminal law like the new draft Corporate Sanctioning Act does not seem 
to be advisable, because for reasons set out above, such approach is quite far away from 
the German legal culture. But even though there are many good arguments to keep the 
current system and to empower the current criminal and regulatory sanctions law with 
more life, for example by investing into manpower and expertise in many German states, 
it appears the time has come for moving on. The coalition's demands perfectly fit into the 
political climate.  
Very often the accusation that criminal law de lege lata does not have sufficient preventive 
effects and that large companies take calculable risks, does not seem to be right. Already 
today the costs for internal investigations, fines and civil law consequences are very high 
and represent large burdens and risks. The allegation that cases of "organised irresponsi-
bility" give rise to unacceptable gaps in criminal liability is also exaggerated. Even in the 
case of complex organisational corporate structures, the individual perpetrators must gen-
erally be identified, so that culpable failure of corresponding supervisory structures can 
be prosecuted. All it needs is a system with sufficient resources at the levels of the prose-
cutors and the courts. 
